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Introducing a coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations, we examine how effectively equilibria based on
coalitional stability refine Nash equilibria in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-strategic substitutes and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-monotone externalities. From
the existing equilibria such as coalition-proof Nash equilibria and near-strong Nash equilibria, we can consider
several ways to restrict coalitional deviations. We incorporate two natural self-enforcing conditions of coalition
deviations, Nash stability and irreversibility, into the coalitional equilibrium and provide a more general analysis
than earlier studies. We find it impossible that in each of the two stability concepts, the coalitional equilibrium
effectively refines the Nash equilibrium for all games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-strategic substitutes and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-monotone externalities.
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1 Introduction
We study the refinement of Nash equilibria in a strategic-form game with strategic substitutes (SS) and monotone
externalities (ME). Since this game has many examples of economic games such as the Cournot oligopoly game
and the game of the private provision of public goods, it is important from the viewpoint of applied game theory
to clarify characteristics of the equilibria of this game. The Nash equilibrium, the standard equilibrium concept
of the strategic-form game, is not necessarily uniquely determined in this game.1 Hence, we apply “coalitional
refinements” of the Nash equilibrium to the game.
Yi (1999) is the first study to apply the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (Bernheim et al., 1987) to a class of games
with SS and ME. Yi (1999) shows that every Pareto-undominated pure-strategy Nash equilibrium is coalition-proof.
Shinohara (2010) shows that in the same game, the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria coincides with the entire
set of pure-strategy Nash equilibria. Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) clarify many properties of the coalition-proof
Nash equilibria in 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-strategic substitutes (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS) and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-monotone externalities (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME),
which generalize Yi’s (1999) and Shinohara’s (2010) games. Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) show that the set of
coalition-proof Nash equilibria under strong Pareto dominance (sCPN equilibria, for short) and the entire set of
Nash equilibria coincide in these games. They also examine coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak Pareto
dominance (wCPN equilibria, for short) and show that the set of wCPN equilibria also coincides with the set of Nash
∗This article is a translated version of R. Shinohara (2019) “Senryakutekidaitai gemu niokeru teikeikinkou: Teikeiridatsu no jikokousokusei
to fukagyakusei,” in R. Shinohara eds. Koukyoukeizaigaku to seijitekiyouin–Keizaiseisaku seido no hyouka to sekkei, Nippon Hyoron Sha, 37-56
(printed in Japanese). I would like to express deep appreciation to the Institute of Comparative Economic Studies, Hosei University (the copyright
holder of the Japanese version of this article) for the permission to translate the article.
†Department of Economics, Hosei University, 4342 Aihara-machi, Machida, Tokyo, 194-0298, Japan. Tel: (81)-42-783-2534. Fax: (81)-42-783-
2611. E-mail: ryusukes@hosei.ac.jp
1See Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) for examples of games that have multiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
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equilibria if the best reply correspondence of all players is at most singleton-valued in the same games. Another
familiar equilibrium to refine the Nash equilibria is a strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959). However, since the
strong Nash equilibrium is too demanding, the set of strong Nash equilibria may be empty, although the set of Nash
equilibria is nonempty in the games of Quartieri and Shinohara (2015). Therefore, it seems difficult that the familiar
equilibria based on coalitional stability single out a particular Nash equilibrium from multiple Nash equilibria for
games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME.
In this study, we examine whether the equilibrium based on coalitional stability that is both weaker than the
strong Nash equilibrium and stronger than the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium effectively refines the Nash equilib-
rium. Some “intermediate” equilibrium concepts already exist. We can take a semi-strong Nash equilibrium (Kaplan,
1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 1994) and a near-strong Nash equilibrium (Rozenfeld and Tennenholtz, 2010) as examples
of such equilibria.
What is new in this study is the introduction of a new concept of coalitional equilibria with restricted deviations,
which makes it possible to unify the analysis with the intermediate equilibria. The coalitional equilibrium with
restricted deviations is a non-cooperative equilibrium that is stable only against some restricted deviations. The re-
stricted deviations consist of the set of feasible coalitions and feasible deviation strategies for each feasible coalition.
They capture the idea that for geographical, legal, or political reasons and so on, not every player can communicate
with each other and coalitions that can form are restricted; each feasible coalition faces a self-enforcing problem
and its feasible deviation strategies are surely restricted in order for it to execute the deviation. The merit of the
coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations is that we can adequately restate several familiar equilibrium con-
cepts by setting the structure of feasible coalitions and that of feasible deviation strategies, which is formally stated
in Proposition 1 below.
We impose an admissible condition on the structure of feasible coalitions, so that deviations by each individual
player is possible. We impose two natural self-enforceabilities for deviation strategies, Nash stability (NS) and irre-
versibility (IR). NS requires that the deviation strategies of each feasible coalition must be a Nash equilibrium in the
game induced by taking players’ strategies outside the coalition as fixed. IR requires that the deviation strategies
of each feasible coalition must be robust to switching-back options: after the deviation, no member of the coalition
switches back to the strategy before deviation, taking the others’ strategies as fixed.2
We examine how effectively the coalitional equilibria under NS and IR refine Nash equilibria. We first show that
under the admissible structure of feasible coalitions, the set of the coalitional equilibria with NS coincides with the
set of Nash equilibria in every game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. Hence, the coalitional equilibria with NS does not refine
the Nash equilibria. We second show that in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-single crossing property, which is stronger than 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS,
and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, the set of the coalitional equilibria with IR coincides with the set of Nash equilibria. While there is an
example of a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME in which the coalitional equilibrium with IR refines the Nash equilibrium,
as Example 1 shows, there is a set of games with the same conditions in which Nash equilibria are multiple and the
coalitional equilibria with IR does not refine the Nash equilibrium.
We conclude that under NS, which seems to be acceptable as coalitional self-enforceability in non-cooperative
games, it is impossible that the coalitional equilibrium provides effective refinements of the Nash equilibrium for
games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME that have multiple Nash equilibria. If we would like to single out some particular Nash
equilibria among all the equilibria, we must make the self-enforcing requirement weaker than the NS. The IR is one
of the examples. However, it is another problem whether or not we accept the IR or weaker concepts, which do not
satisfy the NS, as a self-enforcing requirement because the NS can be considered as a “minimal requirement” for
self-enforceability of coalition deviations. Therefore, to refine the Nash-equilibrium analysis through the coalitional
equilibria, we must apply self-enforcing conditions, which are mathematically definable but may be unjustifiable as
“natural” coalitional behavior in economic meaning.
2As we will see later, the set of self-enforcing deviations in w and sCPN equilibria satisfy NS and IR. The set of feasible deviations in near-
strong Nash equilibria satisfy IR.
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Related literature
Ichiishi (1981) introduces a social coalitional equilibrium, which includes the Nash equilibrium and the core of coop-
erative games with nonsidepayments as special cases. In Ichiishi’s (1981) equilibrium, each feasible coalition faces
a restriction of deviation strategies. The feasible deviation strategies of a coalition depends on strategies of players
outside the coalition, as ours does. However, Ichiishi (1981) does not consider suitable notions of coalitional self-
enforceability, unlike ours. Also, in his equilibrium, the coalition that can be formed is not restricted: deviations by
any coalition are possible. Zhao (1992) introduces the hybrid solution, which can also express the Nash equilibrium
and the core by setting coalition structures appropriately. Laraki (2009) introduces an equilibrium concept called
a coalitional equilibrium. Like ours, in his equilibrium, the coalition formation is restricted. However, unlike ours,
the deviation strategies of each coalition are not restricted. His is equivalent with ours if each feasible coalition
can take all joint strategies in our equilibrium. In this sense, ours is more general than Laraki’s. Finally, we would
like to add that Ichiishi (1981), Zhao (1992), and Laraki (2009) focus on the existence of equilibria, but not on their
characterization of it. The coalitional refinements of Nash equilibria have been well studied for games with strategic
complements. See Milgrom and Roberts (1996), Quartieri (2013), and Shinohara (2019).
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Strategic substitutes and monotonic externalities in 𝝈𝝈𝝈𝝈-interactive games
A strategic-form game is a list Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ), in which 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a finite and nonempty set of players and,
for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ ∅ is player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s strategy set and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 :
∏
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 → R is player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖’s payoff function.3 A subset of 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
is called a coalition. For each coalition 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and each strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ ∏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , the set of strategy profiles for
coalition𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ,
∏
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , is denoted by 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . A typical element of 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 is denoted by 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 . Using this notation, we can express
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 =
(
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
)
for each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . If a coalition is a singleton (that is, 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 = {𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} for some 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ), then we simply denote
its strategy profile by 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and its set of strategy profiles 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . Hereafter, the complement of coalition {𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} is denoted by
−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , not 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}, for simplicity.
For the game Γ, the best response correspondence of player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is defined as 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 → 2𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 such that
𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ↦→ argmax
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧∈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) .
The game on which we focus satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactivity, which is defined as follows:
Definition 1 A game Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) is a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game if and only if
1. 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ⊆ R for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and
2. For each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , there exists a function 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 → R such that 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is non-decreasing in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ( 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≠ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) and constant
in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ; for all 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠).
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-strategic substitutes and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-single-crossing property exhibit non-increasing properties of the best response
function with regard to strategies of the rival players.
Definition 2 A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive strategic substitutes (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS) if and
only if for all (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖) ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 × 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 × 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ,
𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) ,𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) implies𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑤𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
Definition 3 A game Γ = [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-single crossing property (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP) if and only if for all 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
and all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , if 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥), and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ≥ 0, then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) > 0.
3The model in this study is based on that in Quartieri and Shinohara (2015).
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Note that for each game, 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP implies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS, but the converse is not true. A game in Example 1 below satisfies
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS, but not 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP.
Definition 4
• A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-increasing externalities (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE) if and only if for all 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑁𝑁𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , if 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) ≤ 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥), then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) ≤ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥).
• A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-decreasing externalities (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE) if and only if
[𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (−𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] is a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE.
• A 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game Γ = [𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ] satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-monotone externalities (𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME) if and only if Γ satisfies
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE or 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE.
Our focus is limited to pure-strategies. Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) present several examples of games of
economic interest that satisfy 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. They show examples that havemultiple pure-strategy Nash equilibria.
Hence, the class of our games also possibly includes games with multiple equilibria.
2.2 Preliminary results on coalition-proofness
The Nash equilibrium is defined as usual.
Definition 5 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be a game. A strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a Nash equilibrium for Γ if and
only if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . The set of Nash equilibria in Γ is denoted by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
Pareto domination among strategy profiles are also usual.
Definition 6 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be a game. A strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 strongly Pareto dominates in Γ a
strategy profile 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 if and only if 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧) < 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . The s-efficient subset of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is the set of Nash
equilibria for Γ that are not strongly Pareto dominated in Γ by other Nash equilibria for Γ. The s-efficient subset of
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is denoted by 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
For preparation, we introduce a notion of induced games.
Definition 7 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be a game. Let 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ∈ 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \ {∅}, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , and for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 , ?̃?𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 → R,
?̃?𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 : 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ↦→ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ). The game induced by 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 at 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is the game (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑁𝑁 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 𝑁𝑁 (?̃?𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ) and is denoted by Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 .
A coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, introduced in Bernheim et al. (1987), is as follows.
Definition 8 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be a game. If |𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 | = 1, then 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is an s-coalition-proof Nash equilib-
rium for Γ if and only if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . Now assume that |𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 | ≥ 2 and that an s-coalition-proof Nash equilibrium has been
defined for games with fewer than |𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 | players. Then,
• 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is an s-self-enforcing strategy for Γ if and only if it is an s-coalition-proof Nash equilibrium for Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶
for all nonempty 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶 ⊂ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ;
• 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is an s-coalition-proof Nash equilibrium for Γ if and only if it is s-self-enforcing for Γ and there does
not exist another s-self-enforcing strategy for Γ that strongly Pareto dominates 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 in Γ.
The set of s-coalition-proof Nash equilibria in Γ is denoted by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
By definition, it is clear that 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ⊆ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ⊆ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 for all Γ. As pointed out by Bernheim et al. (1987), 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
and 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 are not related by inclusion for some Γ. However, Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) show the equivalence
between these three sets in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME.
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Result 1 (Quartieri and Shinohara, 2015) Let Γ be a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-strategic substitutes and monotone
externalities. Then,





(1.2) If 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is single-valued for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then the set of Nash equilibria and the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria
with weak domination coincide.4
The results suggest that in games with strategic substitutes and monotone externalities, it seems very problem-
atical that the coalition-proof Nash equilibrium refines the set of Nash equilibria when they are multiple. Hence,
our question moves to whether some other equilibrium concepts, which are stronger than the coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium, refine the Nash equilibrium.
2.3 Coalitional equilibria with restricted deviations
We introduce a new concept, called a coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations. We provide a general notion
of restriction of coalition deviations such that the coalition deviations can be restricted to express some earlier
equilibrium concepts.
For a game Γ =
(
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
)
, C ⊆ 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅} is defined as a nonempty set of feasible coalitions: only the
coalitions in C can deviate. For each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , denote the set of strategies that coalition 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 can take
when deviating from 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 by 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . Denote R𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ≡ (𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠∈𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 for each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and RC ≡ (R𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷∈C . We term a pair (C𝑁𝑁RC)
the set of feasible deviations.
Definition 9 Let Γ =
(
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
)
be a game. Let (C𝑁𝑁RC) be the set of feasible deviations. 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a
(C𝑁𝑁RC)-coalitional equilibrium in Γ if there do not exist 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 such that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for each
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . The set of (C𝑁𝑁RC)-coalitional equilibrium in Γ is denoted by 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) .
Next, we introduce a few conditions for the set of feasible deviations. First of all, we introduce the notion of
admissibility, which requires that every player can deviate by using every strategy available to it. This requirement
seems very natural since each player is assumed to freely choose its strategies in noncooporative games.
Definition 10 (C𝑁𝑁RC) is admissible if for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , {𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖} ∈ C and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
Henceforth, we assume that admissibility is satisfied.
The Nash stability for coalition deviations, defined as follows, seems reasonable under admissibility, because
agreed coalition deviations must be immune to the deviation by single members of the coalition under the situation
in which every player can take every strategy by admissibility.
Definition 11 Let Γ =
(
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
)
be a game. (C𝑁𝑁RC) satisfies Nash stability (NS) if for each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and





𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 |𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′′𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
′′
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }.
A stability notion weaker than the NS is also introduced as follows:
Definition 12 Let Γ =
(
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 𝑁𝑁 (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
)
be a game. (C𝑁𝑁RC) satisfies irreversibility (IR) if for each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and
each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ,
𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ⊆ {𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 |𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }𝑁𝑁 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷}.
4The coalition-proof Nash equilibria with weak domination can be defined as in Definition 8 by replacing strong Pareto dominance with weak
Pareto dominance. See, for instance, Shinohara (2005) and Quartieri and Shinohara (2015) for the precise definition.
15
Ryusuke Shinohara
Denote (C,RC) satisfying NS and that satisfying IR by (C,R𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁C ) and (C,R
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼
C ), respectively. These two notions
of stability capture the idea of “self-enforceability.” That is, although each feasible coalition can freely deviate from
certain strategies, no member of feasible coalitions can enforce the other members to take and stick to certain
deviation strategies. Hence, for a coalition deviation to be done assuredly, the deviation must be “stable” against
any further deviation by proper coalition. NS assumes that once a coalition deviates, then each individual member
of the coalition deviates further if he/she has a strategy that improves his/her payoff after the original deviation.
Under NS, each feasible coalition can conduct the deviations immune to such further deviations. IR is based on the
idea that if a coalition deviates, then each individual member of the coalition has an option to withdraw from the
deviation and switch back to the original strategy. Under IR, each feasible coalition deviates in such a way that no
member executes such an option. Clearly, if RC satisfies NS, then it also satisfies IR. Hence, for each C and for each
Γ, if a strategy profile is a (C,R𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼C )-coalitional equilibrium in Γ, then it is a (C,R
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
C )-coalitional equilibrium in Γ;
however, the converse is not true.
Proposition 1 summarizes the relation between the (C,RC)-coalitional equilibrium and several well-known
non-cooperative equilibria.
Proposition 1 Let Γ be a game and let (C,RC) be an admissible set of feasible deviations.
(1) 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) ⊆ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . Further, if C = {{ 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗}| 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 }, then 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
(2) If C = 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅} and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 for each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then (C,RC)-coalitional equilibrium is equivalent
with the strong Nash equilibrium (Aumann, 1959).5
(3) If C = {𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, { 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗}𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 } and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 for each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
(4) If C = 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅} and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 for each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C for each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then (C,RC)-coalitional equilibrium is
equivalent with the semi-strong Nash equilibrium in Γ (Kaplan, 1992; Milgrom and Roberts, 1994).6 Under the
same C and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 for each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , (C,RC)-coalitional equilibrium is an s-coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium in Γ.
(5) If C = 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅} and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = {𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 |𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷} for each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and each
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C, then (C,RC)-coalitional equilibrium is equivalent with the near-strong Nash equilibrium (Rozenfeld and
Tenneholz, 2010).7
Proof of Proposition 1 is in the Appendix.
Remark 1 Milgrom and Roberts (1996) incorporate another notion of restricted coalition formation into the coalition-
proof Nash equilibrium. They define a coalition deviation process as a finite sequence of coalitions 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 = (𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1, . . . ,𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚)
such that 𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 is a positive integer and 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑚𝑚𝑚𝑚 ⊊ · · · ⊊ 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 : this sequence indicates that 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 can communicate to
deviate from a strategy profile; once 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1 has deviated, then 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶2 can plan a further deviation from the 𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶1’s deviation,
and so on. The set of such sequences, generically denoted by Σ, is called a coalition communication structure (CCS).
Milgrom and Roberts (1996) impose CCS on some admissibility conditions, which implies that every coalition in
the sequences take a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding induced game, and they define a coalition-proof Nash
equilibrium with CCS along the sequences in Σ, recursively. As in Definition 8, each feasible coalition designated
by CCS takes a self-enforcing deviation when deviating. By the definition of the coalition-proof Nash equilibria
with CCS, the self-enforcing deviations must be a Nash equilibrium in the corresponding induced game. Thus,
5A strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a strong Nash equilibrium if and only if there is no pair (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ∈ 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅} ×𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 such that𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 )
for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 .
6A strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a semi-strong Nash equilibrium if and only if there is no pair (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ∈ 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅} × 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 such that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) <
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 .
7A strategy profile 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 is a near-strong Nash equilibrium if there is no pair (𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ∈ 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅}×𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 such that for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ,𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) >
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷∪{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖}) .
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if C = {𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 |𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is the first element of some 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 ∈ Σ} and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 for each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and each 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C, then
(C,RC)-coalitional equilibrium is a coalition-proof Nash equilibrium with Σ.8
3 Results
The following lemma is a result commonly used in the proof of Propositions 2 and 3.
Lemma 1 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. For each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , if
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 when Γ is a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) > 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for
each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 when Γ is a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE.
Proof. We provide a proof in the case of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE. The case of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE is similar. Suppose that there exists 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 such that
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≥ 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). Since 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ). Since 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is constant in the 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗-th argument,
then 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) ≥ 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). By 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE, 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). Thus, 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ≤ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), which is a contradiction. ■
Note that this lemma is irrelevant to 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS.
3.1 Coalitional equilibria with NS
Proposition 2 Suppose that Γ is a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, C is an admissible set of feasible coali-
tions, and RC are feasible deviations satisfying NS. Then, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
Proof. Consider games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE. The proof for the games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE is similar. By part (1) of Proposition 1,
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) ⊆ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . We show the converse. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) . Then, 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C
and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 exist such that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . Since 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)
and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . Applying Lemma 1 to Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 yields 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) > 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . Since
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 is non-decreasing in all arguments, then the last inequality implies that there exists 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 such that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ > 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ .
However, by 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS, 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) > 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠), and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ∈ 𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑏𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) imply 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ≤ 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ , which is a contradiction.
■
By Proposition 2, in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, the (C,R𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁C )-coalitional equilibrium exists whenever the Nash
equilibrium does. However, no (C,R𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁C )-coalitional equilibrium refines the set of Nash equilibria. As we see in (4)
of Proposition 1, the semi-strong Nash equilibrium, which is stronger than the s-coalition-proof Nash equilibria,
can be expressed by a (C,R𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁C )-coalitional equilibrium with some (C,R
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
C ). Even if we use an equilibrium concept
that is stronger than the s-coalition-proof Nash equilibrium, if it is based on the NS, then it never refines the Nash
equilibrium in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. This result points out the difficulty of refining the Nash equilibria by the
equilibrium based on NS.
This result stems from the order structure of the set of Nash equilibria in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS. As Quartieri and
Shinohara (2015) show in their Theorem 2, in each game Γ with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS, it is impossible that 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁
and all distinct 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . However, by Lemma 1, in each game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE (resp. 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE), 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 strongly Pareto dominates
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 only if 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) (resp. 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) > 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠)) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . These apply to any game induced by any 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′ ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 and any
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ⊆ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . Therefore, NS and coalitional profitability are incompatible in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME.
3.2 Coalitional equilibria with IR
We examine whether a coalitional equilibrium with IR, which is stronger than that with NS, refines the Nash equi-
librium in 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. Proposition 3 shows that given C, the coalitional equilibria
with IR do not refine the Nash equilibria in a proper subclass of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME.
8Shinohara (2010) shows that the set of coalition-proof Nash equilibria with CCS coincides with the entire set of Nash equilibria in games





















Figure 1: The graph of 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . The left figure is the case of 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 > 4.4 and the right figure is the case of 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 ≤ 4.4.
Proposition 3 Suppose that Γ is a 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, C is an admissible set of feasible
coalitions, and RC represents feasible deviations satisfying IR. Then, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) = 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
Proof. We treat the case of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-IE. The case of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE is similar. By part (1) of Proposition 1, 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) ⊆ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . We show
the converse. Suppose, to the contrary, that there exists 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) . Then, there exists 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
such that for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , (a) 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) and (b) 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ). By (a), applying Lemma 1
to Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 yields 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . By this condition, we have 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ for some 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 . Since 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 is
a Nash equilibrium, then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ) ≥ 0. By the 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ < 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ , and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) < 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ), we reveal that
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∗ (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) > 0, which is a contradiction with (b). ■
The set of 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP is a proper subset of the set of games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS. For example, see
Example 1, which provides a game satisfying 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS but not 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP. The implication of the result is that in games
with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, the coalitional equilibrium with IR exists whenever a Nash equilibrium exists. However, the
coalitional equilibrium with IR never refines the Nash equilibrium.
However, the following example shows the possibility that the coalitional equilibrium with IR works as a refine-
ment of the Nash equilibrium in games with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME but not 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP.
Example 1 Let Γ = (𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁, (𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , (𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 )𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖∈𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ) be such that 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = {1, 2} and for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [0, 5.6] and
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) =


10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ [0, 1]
2
9 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
79 − 18𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
9 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}]
10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 if 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈
(
min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}, 5.6
]
and 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 > 4.4
, (1)
where 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . Suppose that C = 2𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \{∅} and 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 = {𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 |𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷} for each
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ C and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . We denote a typical graph of 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 when fixing 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 in Figure 1.
Fact 1 Let 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) = 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 for each pair 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 such that 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and each 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . This game is then a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE, but not 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP.
Fact 2 It follows that ∅ ≠ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) ⊊ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 .
Proofs of Facts 1 and 2 are in the Appendix.
By Proposition 2, no coalitional equilibria based on Nash stable coalitional deviations refine the Nash equilib-
ria: hence, the s-coalition-proof Nash equilibria and the semi-strong Nash equilibria are not refinements of Nash
equilibria. In addition, since the best response correspondence of each player is singleton-valued, then the set of
coalition-proof Nash equilibria under weak Pareto domination does not refine the Nash equilibria either (see Result
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1-(1.2)).9 Of course, no strong Nash equilibrium exists. Thus, by this example, we can point out that in games with
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME, but not 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP, a coalitional equilibrium with IR may provide a refinement of the Nash equilibrium,
although the equilibrium concepts which are frequently used in economics can not refine the Nash equilibrium.10
4 Conclusion
Introducing the coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations, we examine how effectively equilibria based on
coalitional stability refine Nash equilibria in 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games with strategic substitutes and monotone external-
ities. The coalitional equilibrium with restricted deviations can express several familiar equilibria as special cases
by setting feasible coalition deviations appropriately. Thereby, we can provide a unified analysis for the issue.
We impose two stability conditions (NS and IR) on feasible coalition deviations. First, we have shown that the
set of the coalitional equilibria with NS coincides with the set of Nash equilibria in every 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive game with
𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS and 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-ME. Hence, the coalitional equilibria with NS does not refine the Nash equilibria in that game. Second,
we have pointed out the possibility that the coalitional equilibrium with IR, which is stronger than the equilibrium
with NS, singles out a particular Nash equilibrium from all Nash equilibria in that game. We observe this possibility
in 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-interactive games that satisfy 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS, but not 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP (see Example 1).
If no member of a coalition can force other members to take certain deviation strategies, then whether the
coalition deviation is possible depends on whether it is “self-enforcing”. As discussed previously, requiring the NS
on coalition deviations seems reasonable in non-cooperative games because the NS is immune to all single-member
deviations of the coalition. Hence, we can consider the NS as the “minimal requirement” for self-enforceability of
coalition deviations. On the other hand, the IR is weaker than the NS, and hence it does not satisfy this minimal
requirement. If we would like to single out a particular Nash equilibrium from multiple Nash equilibria, we must
apply self-enforcing conditions, which are mathematically definable but may be unjustifiable as “natural" coalitional
behavior in economic meaning.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
(1), (2), (3), and (5) are immediate from the definitions of equilibria.




𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . By the definition of s-coalition-proof
Nash equilibrium, the set of s-self-enforcing deviations of 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is a subset of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . Second, suppose that 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠
𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 =
{𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 |𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ′𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷\{𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 }, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 ) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷}. We then note that 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸
Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷
𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 ⊆ 𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑅𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 and the set of s-self-
enforcing deviations of 𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷 is a subset of 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ |𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠−𝐷𝐷𝐷𝐷𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . Hence, in any case, (C,RC)-coalitional equilibrium is robust to the
self-enforcing deviations. ■
Proof of Fact 1
First, as a preparation for proof of Fact 1, we show Claim 1.
Claim 1 If 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = [0, 5.6] for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 , then 10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , and 29−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
79−18𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗+𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 are decreasing in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 .
Proof of Claim 1. Clearly, 10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 are decreasing in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . Differentiating 29−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
79−18𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗+𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 in 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , we
9The coalition-proof Nash equilibrium under weak Pareto domination is defined by replacing strong Pareto dominance of s-coalition-proof
Nash equilibria with weak Pareto dominance. See also Corollary 2 in Quartieri and Shinohara (2015).
10For further information, all Nash equilibria in this example are strict Nash equilibria, which are also trembling-hand-perfect Nash equilibria








9 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
79 − 18𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
9 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
)
=
2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 18𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 83
(9 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )2
.
Since 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = [0, 5.6], then 2𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 18𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 − 83 is maximized at (𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) = (5.6, 5.6) and the maximum value is −2.36.
Thus, 29−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 +
79−18𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗+𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 is also decreasing in 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . (End of Proof of Claim 1)
We first verify that this game satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE. Let 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and let 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 be such that 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 < 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 . We show that
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) ≥ 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ). Note that 1 < min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6} ≤ min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6} and the last inequality holds with equality
if 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 4.4.
By Claim 1, if 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈ [0, 1] ∪ [1,min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}] ∪ (min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}, 5.6], then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) < 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) because
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥) =






9−𝑧𝑧𝑧𝑧 if 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈ [1,min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}]
10 − 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 if 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈ (min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}, 5.6]
for each 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 }. If 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈
(
min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}, min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}
]
, then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) = 10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) = 29−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 +
79−18𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +(𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )2
9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
. Denote 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 = 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕
′′
𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 , where 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 > 0. Then, we have
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) =
−11 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 2𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 (9 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )
9 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
>
−11 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + 2min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6} + 𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 (9 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )




9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 (7−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )
9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
> 0 if min{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6} = 10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
0.2+𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 +𝑑𝑑𝑑𝑑 (9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )
9−𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
> 0 otherwise
because 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ′′𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ≤ 5.6. In conclusion, this game satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE.
We secondly verify that this game satisfies 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS. Let 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 be such that 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 and 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . First, if 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ (4.4, 5.6],
then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕) is maximized at 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 as we can see in Figure 1. Second, if 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ [0, 4.4], then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕) is locally




{10 − 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 } if 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ∈ (4.4, 5.6]
{5.6} otherwise
. (2)
Clearly, this is a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS.
We can also verify that this is not a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SCP. We have that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.2, 4.5) = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.4, 4.5) = 5.5 and
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.2, 5) = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.4, 5) = 5; hence, 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.2, 4.5) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.4, 4.5) = 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.2, 5) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (5.4, 5) = 0, which implies that this
game does not satisfy 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-SS. ■
Proof of Fact 2
By (2),
𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 = {(𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕1, 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2) : 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕1 + 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕2 = 10 and 4.4 ≤ 𝜕𝜕𝜕𝜕𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≤ 5.6 for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 } .
First, we verify 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗ = (5, 5) ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 \𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) . The payoff to all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 at 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
∗ is 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗) = 6. If the two players deviate
from 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗ to 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 = (0, 0), then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒) = 10 for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . If player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 switches back to 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 5 given 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 for 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , then
20
Coalitional equilibria in non-cooperative games with strategic substitutes: Self-enforcing coalition deviations and irreversibility
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) = 899 . Therefore, no player 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 switches back to the original strategy 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 .
Second, we verify that 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗ = (4.4, 5.6) ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) . At 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
∗∗, 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗) = 5.4 and 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢2 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗) = 6.6. Let 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ 𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑆𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 be deviating
strategies from 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗ such that 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗) for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . Since this is a game with 𝜎𝜎𝜎𝜎-DE, then 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 for each
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 by Lemma 1. We then have
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 < 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒
∗∗
𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 10 − 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 < 10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 for all 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 such that 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ≠ 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 . (3)
Claim 2 If there exist distinct 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 such that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈
[
1,min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}
]
, then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠).
Proof of Claim 2. By (3), 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ [1,min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}]. Hence, for each 𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 ∈ {𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 },
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥, 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) =
1
9 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗
(
2𝑥𝑥𝑥𝑥 + 79 − 18𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 + (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 )2
)
and 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 > 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 implies 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠). (End of Proof of Claim 2)
Claim 3 If there exist distinct 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖, 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 such that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈
(
min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}, 5.6
]
, then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠).
Proof of Claim 3. Since 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗1 = 4.4 > 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1, then it is impossible that 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 2 and 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1. (If 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 2 and 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1, then(
min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 𝑗𝑗𝑗𝑗 , 5.6}, 5.6
]
is empty.) We consider the case of 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 1 and 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 = 2. In this case, note that 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ≥ 4.4. Since
𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 ≤ 5.6, then min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2, 5.6} ≥ 4.4. Since 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗1 = 4.4, then 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗1 ∈ [1,min{10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2, 5.6}]. Hence,
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢1 (𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗1 , 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2) = 10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 −
(







(End of Proof of Claim 3)
Claim 4 If 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0, 1]2, then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢2 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗2 ) > 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢2 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠).
Proof of Claim 4. By (1), since 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 ∈ [0, 1]2, then 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) ∈ [8, 10] for each 𝑖𝑖𝑖𝑖 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 . We have
𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢2 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠) − 𝑢𝑢𝑢𝑢2 (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗2 ) = 10 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 −
(
90.2 − 18𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 + (𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1)2
9 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1
)
= −0.2 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 + 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠2 (9 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1)
9 − 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1
< 0
because 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠1 ≤ 1. (End of Proof of Claim 4)
By Claims 2 to 4, for each improving deviation 𝑠𝑠𝑠𝑠 , there is at least one player 𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘 ∈ 𝑁𝑁𝑁𝑁 that switches back to 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗
𝑘𝑘𝑘𝑘
.
Therefore, 𝑒𝑒𝑒𝑒∗∗ ∈ 𝐸𝐸𝐸𝐸Γ(C,RC) .
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